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THROUGH ANOTHER’S EYES: GETTING 
THE BENEFIT OF OUTSIDE PERSPECTIVES 
IN ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW 
Holly Doremus* 
Abstract: The Deepwater Horizon blowout has important lessons to teach 
about environmental review. It is easy to scapegoat the former Minerals 
Management Service (MMS) for shoddy environmental analysis. But cap-
tive agencies are a common phenomenon. Oversight by environmental 
mission agencies is supposed to provide a check on their myopia. Several 
external reviews of MMS’s environmental analysis were conducted, but 
none uncovered MMS’s wildly incorrect estimates of the probability, 
magnitude, and consequences of a blowout. This article details the exter-
nal reviews, explains why they proved ineffective, and offers suggestions 
for improvement. Outside review cannot be effective unless reviewers un-
derstand the importance of their task, are able to focus on the key aspects 
of analyses they are reviewing, and can bring the appropriate expertise to 
bear. All of these elements were missing in reviews of the analysis that 
preceded drilling in the Macondo prospect. Their availability for future 
reviews would be improved if the executive branch took some relatively 
easy unilateral steps. 
Introduction 
 On the night of April 20, 2010, a series of explosions ripped 
through the Deepwater Horizon, a mobile oil drilling rig operating fifty 
miles off the coast of Louisiana on a site leased by BP from the federal 
government, known as the Macondo prospect.1 Eleven people died in 
the explosions and ensuing fire.2 The rig sank, shearing off the pipe 
which connected the well to the platform. A device called a blowout 
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1 See Peter Lehner with Bob Deans, In Deep Water: The Anatomy of a Disaster, 
the Fate of the Gulf, and Ending Our Oil Addiction, at viii (2010); Rick Jervis, Re-
search Teams Find Oil on Bottom of Gulf, USA Today, Oct. 25, 2010, at 3A (noting that the 
well was fifty miles off the coast). 
2 See Lehner with Deans, supra note 1, at 43 (providing a vivid account of the explo-
sion and the chaotic evacuation of the rig). 
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preventer, intended “to crush, shear and seal the pipe”3 in a disaster, 
had been installed at the sea floor against just such an emergency.4 But 
it failed to operate, leaving the uncontrolled well gushing oil and natu-
ral gas into the Gulf of Mexico.5 By the time the well was finally sealed,6 
nearly five million barrels (more than 200 million gallons) of oil had 
spewed out of the Macondo well.7 The environmental and economic 
costs of the disaster may not be fully understood for many years. 
 This Article focuses on what the Gulf disaster can teach us about 
our environmental planning framework. A suite of federal laws, includ-
ing the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),8 Endangered Spe-
cies Act (ESA),9 and Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA),10 are sup-
posed to ensure that we understand the potential environmental trade-
offs of our offshore energy development decisions before committing 
to them, and that those trade-offs stay within acceptable levels.11 Yet the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster and its consequences were wholly unfore-
seen by key decision makers, raising significant questions about the 
ability of those laws to fulfill their intended purposes.12 
 Unfortunately, so far the Department of Interior shows little inter-
est in learning any lessons about environmental review. In issuing and 
then lifting a short-term moratorium on new drilling in the Gulf, Inte-
rior Secretary Ken Salazar focused almost entirely on improving regula-
tion of operations once drilling has been approved.13 Secretary Salazar 
                                                                                                                      
 
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
5 See id. at 2, 20. 
6 Flow from the well was halted on July 15. Timothy J. Crone & Maya Tolstoy, Magnitude of 
the 2010 Gulf of Mexico Oil Leak, Science, Oct. 29, 2010, at 364. However, the well was not 
permanently sealed until two months later. See Harry R. Weber, Gulf Oil Well Is Dead but the 
Pain Will Remain, ABC News, Sept. 20, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory 
?id=11678895. 
7 See Crone & Tolstoy, supra note 6, at 364; Weber, supra note 6. Estimates of the size of 
the spill vary. One independent calculation put the total flow at 4.4 million barrels plus or 
minus twenty percent. Weber, supra note 6. 
8 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006). 
9 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006). 
10 Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2006). 
11 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1452, 1531; 42 U.S.C. § 4321. 
12 See Minerals Mgmt. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, MMS 2007-003, Outer 
Continental Shelf Oil & Gas Leasing Program: 2007–2012, Final Environmental 
Impact Statement, at IV-1, IV-29 (2007) [hereinafter 2007–2012 FEIS], available at 
http://www.boemre.gov/5-year/2007-2012FEIS.htm (exhibiting the lack of foresight of a 
potential blowout scenario). 
13 See generally Decision Memorandum from Kenneth L. Salazar, Sec’y of the Interior, Ter-
mination of the Suspension of Certain Offshore Permitting & Drilling Activities on the Outer 
Cont’l Shelf, to Dir. of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation & Enforcement (Oct. 12, 2010), 
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did restructure the Minerals Management Service (MMS), creating a 
new Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforce-
ment (BOEMRE) to house leasing and operations management, and 
moving revenue collection to the Secretary’s office,14 but that restruc-
turing does nothing to improve environmental review.15 
 Outside observers have paid more attention to the environmental 
review preceding approval of drilling operations, but they have concen-
trated almost entirely on the shortcomings of MMS’s environmental 
analysis.16 I have no wish to defend MMS, or to minimize the impor-
tance of persuading it to take environmental review more seriously. 
MMS had been a notoriously bad bureaucratic actor for some time,17 
                                                                                                                      
 
available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile& 
PageID=64767. Salazar imposed a moratorium on new deepwater drilling in May, which was 
lifted in October after Interior issued a new safety rule for offshore operations. See id. 
14 U.S. Sec’y of the Interior, Order No. 3299, Establishment of the Bureau of Ocean En-
ergy Management, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, and the Office of 
Natural Resources Revenue (May 19, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhori- 
zon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=32475. For the sake of simplicity and 
because the events considered here occurred before the reorganization, this Article uses the 
old name, MMS, throughout. 
15 See id; Dep’t of Interior, Implementation Report, Reorganization of the Miner-
als Management Service 2 (2010) (indicating that the Order merely reassigns the MMS’s 
duties). 
16 Kristina Alexander, Cong. Research Serv., R41265, The 2010 Oil Spill: The 
Minerals Management Service (MMS) and the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) 1 (2010); Council on Envtl. Quality (CEQ), Exec. Office of the Presi-
dent, Report Regarding the Minerals Management Service’s National Environ-
mental Policy Act Policies, Practices, and Procedures as They Relate to Outer 
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Exploration and Development 1–3 (2010) [hereinaf-
ter CEQ Report]; Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Off-
shore Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore 
Drilling 81–83 (2011) [hereinafter BP Commission Report]; Oliver A. Houck, Worst Case 
and the Deepwater Horizon Blowout: There Ought to Be a Law, 40 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
11,033, 11,033 (2010); The National Environmental Policy Act and Outer Continental Shelf Oil 
and Gas Activities 1, 29–34 (Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Off-
shore Drilling, Staff Working Paper No. 12, 2011), available at http://www.oilspillcommis- 
sion.gov/resources#staff-working-papers. 
17 See generally U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-10-276, Offshore Oil and 
Gas Development: Additional Guidance Would Help Strengthen the Minerals 
Management Service’s Assessment of Environmental Impacts in the North Aleu-
tian Basin (2010) (noting that MMS lacks a handbook “providing guidance on how to 
implement NEPA,” and has unclear policies on what constitutes a significant environ-
mental impact). Beyond the scandals over sex and drugs with industry officials that gar-
nered national attention, MMS’s implementation of NEPA for oil and gas development off 
Alaska had been harshly criticized by the Government Accountability Office in a report 
issued shortly before the Deepwater Horizon blowout. See id; Derek Kravitz & Mary Pat 
Flaherty, Report Says Oil Agency Ran Amok, Wash. Post, Sept. 11, 2008, at A1 (noting that 
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and reforming it is certainly vital to restoring public confidence in off-
shore drilling oversight. But focusing on MMS alone risks missing the 
bigger picture. There will always be agencies that are too close to the 
industries they regulate or take too narrow a view of the public interest. 
The environmental review process is supposed to combat those ten-
dencies by engaging outside agencies with environmental protection 
missions in an oversight role. Several entities reviewed MMS’s environ-
mental analysis, but none raised the alarm about the possibility of an 
uncontrolled blowout.18 The Gulf disaster underscores both the impor-
tance of bringing outside perspectives to bear in environmental review 
and the difficulty of doing so effectively. Those lessons will be impor-
tant as offshore oil exploration resumes, and especially if it expands.19 
But they will be equally important in other contexts where environ-
mental review is conducted by agencies subject to the risk of capture. 
 In this Article, I detail the many opportunities for outside review of 
MMS’s environmental analyses in the Gulf, examine why that review did 
not serve its intended purpose, and offer suggestions for improvement. 
I begin with a quick explanation of the importance of outside perspec-
tives, and the ways that environmental laws build opportunities for en-
vironmental agency oversight into the permit approval process.20 I then 
examine how those reviews played out in the context of the Macondo 
well, showing that they did little to check or improve MMS’s shoddy 
work.21 Finally, I consider why reality did not meet expectations, and 
what changes would improve the effectiveness of mandated outside re-
views.22 
 This analysis reveals flaws that could quickly be fixed by unilateral 
executive action. The Council on Environmental Quality should revive 
                                                                                                                      
the Inspector General found that MMS employees had socialized with oil company em-
ployees at “alcohol-, cocaine- and marijuana-filled parties”). 
18 See infra Part II. 
19 See John M. Broder, Obama to Open Offshore Areas to Oil Drilling, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 
2010, at A1 (noting proposed expansion). The President had proposed expansion shortly 
before the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Id. In December 2010, that plan was officially pro-
nounced dead. John M. Broder & Clifford Krauss, U.S. Drops Bid to Explore Oil in Eastern 
Gulf, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 2010, at A1. Nonetheless, so long as gasoline prices remain high 
there will be pressure to expand offshore oil development. See Carl Hulse, Week Ahead: Debt 
Ceiling and Gas Prices Still Focus of Congress, N.Y. Times (May 2, 2011, 2:25 PM), http://the 
caucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/week-ahead-debt-ceiling-and-gas-prices-still-focus-
of-congress/# (noting that House Republicans are pushing for legislation to expand off-
shore drilling and expedite the permitting process). 
20 See infra Part I. 
21 See infra Part II. 
22 See infra Part III. 
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a robust requirement that NEPA analysis include a frank worst-case 
analysis.23 While it might not improve internal decision-making, that 
analysis should help draw the attention of outside reviewers to the need 
to take a careful look at risk assessment and impact evaluation.24 Out-
side reviewers could also take steps to improve the effectiveness of their 
work. With the help of the Council on Environmental Quality, they 
should demand that environmental documents focus more clearly on 
risks and associated potential impacts. They also need to expand their 
expertise to include familiarity with the technological context of activi-
ties that present serious environmental threats. 
 In the long term, the only way to ensure that environmental review 
makes a difference to decisions about offshore drilling is to add explicit 
substantive environmental protection requirements to the governing 
statutes. That sort of legislative change will not happen soon, but more 
robust outside reviews could help push the political landscape in that 
direction. 
I. Outside Looking In 
A. The Importance of an Outside Perspective 
 Calls for unified environmental regulation and oversight are com-
mon today, for good reason. Fragmentation of authority and responsi-
bility may mean that no one ever takes a comprehensive view of the sys-
tem, or that agencies work at cross-purposes. It can bring unnecessary 
duplication,25 with attendant inefficiencies. More subtly, where multiple 
agencies share authority over the multiple causes of an environmental 
problem, each may be tempted to avoid taking politically difficult steps 
to address it.26 
 The Deepwater Horizon saga, however, reminds us that concentra-
tion of responsibility also has its downsides. As Professors DeShazo and 
                                                                                                                      
23 See infra Part III.B. Oliver Houck has already made a forceful argument for reinvigo-
rating worst-case analysis. See generally Houck, supra note 16. This Article expands on Pro-
fessor Houck’s argument by more deeply exploring how worst-case analysis would improve 
outside agency review. 
24 See infra Part III.B. 
25 William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 
89 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 5–6 (2003). 
26 See id. at 5–6, 27–31; Holly Doremus, Crossing Boundaries: Commentary on “The Law at 
the Water’s Edge,” in Wet Growth: Should Water Law Control Land Use? 271, 295, 300 
(Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, ed., 2005). 
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Freeman put it, “interagency conflict can be productive.”27 Institutional 
separation and redundancy can encourage diversity of ideas and ap-
proaches, combating the tendency to fall into patterns of “group think,” 
where assumptions go unexamined and viewpoints tend to converge on 
an unrealistic extreme.28 Decentralizing authority also reduces the risk 
and consequences of agency “capture,”29 meaning domination by inter-
est groups whose goals diverge from those of the larger political com-
munity.30 At the most basic level, it is more difficult and costly to influ-
ence several agencies.31 In addition, fragmentation creates a role for 
multiple agency cultures and missions, which in turn should help check 
the tendency of development and extraction agencies to see only that 
mission.32 
 Just as regulatory review provides a needed check on self-interested 
and short-sighted firms,33 outside review of the regulator can provide a 
check on capture, group-think, and other shortcomings that interfere 
with regulators’ pursuit of the public interest.34 The late, unlamented 
MMS was a poster child for the importance of that sort of outside 
check.35 
                                                                                                                      
 
27 J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 2217, 
2233 (2005). 
28 Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Oversee-
ing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1655, 1676 (2006). 
29 Id. at 1677. 
30 See Debra L. Donahue, Western Grazing: The Capture of Grass, Ground, and Government, 
35 Envtl. L. 721, 746–47 (2005) (defining “capture”). 
31 See O’Connell, supra note 28, at 1677. 
32 It is widely agreed, for example, that the multiple-use land management agencies 
have maximized output of certain resources, notably timber and forage, at the expense of 
others, such as wildlife and environmental preservation. See, e.g., Eric Biber, Too Many 
Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 Harv. Envtl. L. 
Rev. 1, 1–4 (2009); Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why “Mul-
tiple Use” Failed, 18 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 405, 406–07 (1994); Josh Eagle, Regional Ocean 
Governance: The Perils of Multiple-Use Management and the Promise of Agency Diversity, 16 Duke 
Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 143, 147–48 (2006). 
33 The Deepwater Horizon disaster provides a powerful reminder that self-interest is 
an insufficient motivator for environmental protection. The blowout has cost BP more 
than $11 billion by late November 2010, not including lost profits from the well, and the 
bill is expected to get much higher by the time response costs and damage claims are re-
solved. Steven Mufson, BP to Sell $7 Billion in Argentina Assets, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 2010 at 
A3. BP has sold assets in order to cover the costs. See id. 
34 See infra Part III. 
35 See Memorandum from Earl E. Devaney, Interior Inspector Gen., to Interior Sec’y 
Kempthorne (Sept. 9, 2008), available at http://www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/ 
pdf//RIKinvestigation.pdf. In 2008, after a two-year investigation, the Department of Inte-
rior Inspector General reported a “[c]ulture of [e]thical [f]ailure” at MMS’s royalty-in-
kind office, including “prodigious” acceptance of gifts from industry as well as sexual rela-
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 Ideally, review by someone other than the regulator of the envi-
ronmental impacts of proposed actions should provide three benefits. 
First, it should help counter “mission agency syndrome,” the tendency 
of agencies dedicated to a primary mission to ignore or underplay any-
thing that might conflict with that mission.36 Giving agencies with a 
strongly internalized environmental mission a role in the environmental 
analysis should help keep that analysis honest. Second, effective over-
sight should reduce the impact of routinization. Even with the best of 
intentions, anyone who does the same tasks over and over will tend to 
do them the same way, and to default to familiar routines. Regulatory 
agencies repeatedly required to create environmental documentation 
for similar activities can easily fall into “rubber stamp syndrome,” recy-
cling the same analysis over and over again as boiler plate without seri-
ous consideration.37 Outside reviewers may also fall into such routines, 
but because they are likely to see documentation for a greater variety of 
situations they should be less prone to temptations to recycle. Third, 
and related to the boiler plate issue, outside review should help ensure 
that environmental analysis keeps abreast of technological changes, 
countering “past performance syndrome,” the tendency to assume that 
because there has not been a problem in the past one will not occur in 
the future. It will only do so, of course, if the reviewers understand the 
changing technological landscape. 
B. Building in Outside Review Opportunities 
 Modern environmental law seeks, among other things, to broaden 
the thinking of federal agencies that decide whether to approve, fund, 
or engage in environmentally damaging activities.38 Congress has tried 
                                                                                                                      
tionships and alcohol abuse with industry contacts. Id. at 1–2; see also Kravitz & Flaherty, 
supra note 17. Former MMS officials openly acknowledge that their mission, especially in 
the Gulf of Mexico, was to expedite drilling. Jason DeParle, Leading the Way Into Deep Water, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 2010, at A1. 
36 See Daniel R. Mandelker, Thoughts on NEPA at 40, 39 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 
10,640, 10,640 (2009) (noting the “sometimes myopic vision of federal mission agencies”). 
37 As an early critique of environmental impact analysis noted: “Informal as well as 
formal ‘standard operating procedures’ . . . direct scientific attention to well-marked intel-
lectual grooves.” Eugene Bardach & Lucian Pugliaresi, The Environmental-Impact Statement 
vs. the Real World, Pub. Interest, Fall 1977, at 22, 28. This kind of routinization in part 
responds to organizational expectations like those that produce “scripted” behaviors. See 
Gregg P. Macey, Coasean Blind Spots: Charting the Incomplete Institutionalism, 98 Geo. L.J. 863, 
885–86 (2010) (explaining the concept of scripts as recurrent patterns of interaction 
shaped by institutional contexts). 
38 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006); Major Federal Action, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2010). 
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to combat mission agency syndrome both by modifying internal agency 
processes and by bringing outside pressures to bear.39 
1. NEPA and the Power to Persuade 
 NEPA, the first of the modern generation of environmental stat-
utes, includes provisions designed to work internally and externally. 40 
NEPA forces agencies to confront the environmental consequences of 
their proposed actions by mandating that they prepare “detailed state-
ments,” known as Environmental Impact Statements (EISs), on envi-
ronmental impacts and alternatives before taking actions that signifi-
cantly affect environmental quality.41 Because NEPA requires that each 
agency undertake its own environmental analyses, rather than centraliz-
ing that task in an environmental specialty agency,42 it has the effect of 
diversifying agency staff.43 By restructuring agency bureaucracies, 
NEPA has succeeded in at least providing a voice for environmental 
concerns in every federal agency.44 In some contexts, NEPA’s inward-
focused provisions rapidly drove agency change.45 Other agencies, 
however, proved more resistant to internal pressures.46 
                                                                                                                     
 Under NEPA, comments from outside federal agencies provide the 
key external role. Judicial review is sharply limited; according to the 
Supreme Court, NEPA does not permit courts to second-guess the envi-
ronmental trade-offs agencies choose to make.47 In theory, public over-
sight could provide the needed check, but costs and lack of expertise 
are substantial barriers to effective public review. As Professor Andreen 
 
39 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332. 
40 See id. §§ 4321–4370h. 
41 See id. § 4332(2)(C). 
42 See id. 
43 See Paul J. Culhane, NEPA’s Effect on Agency Decision Making: NEPA’s Impacts on Federal 
Agencies, Anticipated and Unanticipated, 20 Envtl. L. 681, 690–91 (1990); see also Allan F. 
Wichelman, Administrative Agency Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969: A Conceptual Framework for Explaining Differential Response, 16 Nat. Resources J. 263, 
298, 299 (1976) (noting that NEPA’s special requirements would lead to hiring more staff 
members, and that staff would be “exposed to new informational inputs through . . . the 
introduction of new personnel into the agency”). 
44 See generally Serge Taylor, Making Bureaucracies Think (1984); Wichelman, su-
pra note 43, at 263. 
45 See, e.g., Sally K. Fairfax & Barbara T. Andrews, Debate Within and Debate Without: NE-
PA and the Redefinition of the “Prudent Man” Rule, 19 Nat. Resources J. 505, 506–07 (1979); 
H. Paul Friesema & Paul J. Culhane, Social Impacts, Politics, and the Environmental Impact 
Statement Process, 16 Nat. Resources J. 339, 349–51 (1976). 
46 See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 27, at 2220 & n.8 (discussing the historic reluc-
tance of mission agencies to expand their thinking to include environmental concerns). 
47 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350–51 (1989). 
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observed twenty years ago, only the executive branch can effectively 
oversee the substantive implementation of NEPA.48 
 Congress has tried to promote executive branch oversight, provid-
ing for it in three ways.49 First, it created the Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ) in the Executive Office of the President as a counter-
weight to “the more parochial views of the established agencies.”50 CEQ 
has fulfilled that role primarily by developing guidance and regulations 
governing the preparation and content of NEPA documents.51 Second, 
it required that action agencies seek comments on their EISs from 
other federal agencies with “jurisdiction by law or special expertise with 
respect to any environmental impact involved.”52 CEQ regulations im-
pose a mandatory duty for those agencies to comment,53 and allow 
them to refer disputes with the action agency to CEQ.54 
 Not satisfied with these checks alone, in section 309 of the 1970 
Clean Air Act, Congress required that the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) review and comment in writing on the environmental 
trade-offs of proposed federal actions.55 If EPA finds the environmental 
impacts of a proposed action unacceptable, it must refer the action to 
CEQ.56 This provision “was designed to create an advocate within the 
executive branch that would blow the whistle on harmful environ-
mental actions and press the case against such actions all the way to the 
Executive Office of the President.”57 
                                                                                                                      
48 William L. Andreen, In Pursuit of NEPA’s Promise: The Role of Executive Oversight in the 
Implementation of Environmental Policy, 64 Ind. L. J. 205, 209 (1989). 
49 See id. at 212–23 (offering a thorough description of NEPA’s legislative history and 
contemporary commentary). 
50 Id. at 216–17. 
51 See 40 C.F.R. pt. 1500–1508 (2010). 
52 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006). 
53 40 C.F.R. § 1503.2. 
54 Id. § 1504.3. 
55 See 42 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2006). The Senate committee crafting the Clean Air Act fo-
cused on lack of environmental expertise in mission-oriented agencies rather than con-
flicts of interest or agency capture. See Andreen, supra note 48, at 225. In the committee’s 
view, NEPA did not provide an adequate remedy because it did not assure that “‘environ-
mental agencies [would] effectively participate in the decision-making process.’” Id. (quot-
ing S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 44 (1970), reprinted in 1 Legislative History of the Clean 
Air Amendments of 1970, at 443 (1974)). Indeed, the committee found that agencies 
sometimes provided only verbal comments on EISs within their expertise. See, e.g., id. at 
228 (noting an instance when a Senator’s request for comments made on a draft EIS was 
denied because they had only been made orally). 
56 42 U.S.C. § 7609(b). 
57 Andreen, supra note 48, at 229. 
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 Very few interagency disputes have been formally referred to 
CEQ.58 But the prospect of referral “has encouraged moderation and 
compromise” by action agencies in response to comments.59 Agency 
comments are also influential with reviewing courts.60 
2. Environmental Veto Power 
 The NEPA process invites agencies with an environmental mission 
to comment on proposals, and provides an opportunity to elevate dis-
putes about environmental impacts to the White House. Absent presi-
dential intervention, though, it leaves the action agency in control of 
the ultimate decision, with little oversight from the courts.61 Review 
provisions in the Endangered Species Act (ESA)62 and Coastal Zone 
Management Act (CZMA)63 are stronger. They effectively provide veto 
power,64 subject to override measures that are difficult to invoke.65 
 The ESA has been called the “pit bull of environmental laws”66 be-
cause its substantive requirements are, at least on paper, so unyield-
ing.67 Section 7 of the ESA requires that federal agencies “insure” that 
actions they take, authorize, or fund are not likely to jeopardize the 
continued existence of any listed species or adversely modify desig-
nated critical habitat.68 That duty is fulfilled through consultation with 
the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) for terrestrial species, or the Na-
                                                                                                                      
58 See Dep’t of Energy, Referral of Inter-Agency Disagreements to CEQ Under 
the National Environmental Policy Act 2–4 (2009), available at http://ceq.hss.doe. 
gov/nepa/eis/referrals_to_CEQ_Mar09.pdf (documenting that as of March 2009 there 
have been only twenty-seven formal referrals to CEQ, with the most recent occuring in 
2001). 
59 Andreen, supra note 48, at 240. 
60 See Michael C. Blumm & Stephen R. Brown, Pluralism and the Environment: The Role of 
Comment Agencies in NEPA Litigation, 14 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 277, 281–82 (1990). Envi-
ronmental plaintiffs fare better in NEPA litigation when agency comments support their 
position. See id. 
61 See Andreen, supra note 48, at 211. 
62 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006). 
63 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2006). 
64 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1456, 1536. 
65 See 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (noting that actions will not be completed until state agencies 
concur and that exemptions from compliance are granted only if “the activity is in the 
paramount interest of the United States”); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)–(h) (describing the ex-
emption process). 
66 Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Depart-
ments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 277, 279 (1993). 
67 See, e.g., George Cameron Coggins, An Ivory Tower Perspective on Endangered Species 
Law, 8 Nat. Resources & Env’t 3, 3 (1993). 
68 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
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tional Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) for marine species.69 The end 
result of consultation is a biological opinion developed by the wildlife 
agency, determining whether the proposed action would exceed the 
acceptable statutory threshold.70 Although an adverse biological opin-
ion does not technically preclude the action, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that it is highly coercive.71 An agency that ignores such an 
opinion is likely to face litigation in which the biological opinion itself 
will be strong evidence that the action violates the ESA.72 
 Like NEPA comments, section 7 consultations rarely halt projects, 
but frequently produce modifications. Action agencies may tweak their 
proposals, changing the location, scope, or timing, in order to avoid 
formal consultation73 or a jeopardy finding.74 Furthermore, when it 
issues a jeopardy opinion, the wildlife agency must if possible offer 
“reasonable and prudent alternatives,” steps the action agency can take 
to avoid jeopardy.75 While the ESA is designed to give the wildlife agen-
cies veto power over federal actions that would likely cause extinction, 
it carefully circumscribes that power to prevent its overuse.76 
                                                                                                                      
69 Fish & Wildlife Serv. (FWS) & Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NMFS), Consulta-
tion Handbook, Procedures for Conducting Consultation and Conference Activi-
ties Under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, at xx (1998) [hereinafter FWS 
Consultation Handbook]. 
70 See id. at 4–15; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1536(3)(a); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (2010). 
71 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997). 
72 See id. 
73See FWS Consultation Handbook, supra note 69, at 3–6; see also FWS, Consulta-
tions with Federal Agencies: Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act 2 (2010) 
[hereinafter FWS Agency Consultations], available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/ 
esa-library/pdf/consultations.pdf (“A large percentage of projects, as initially planned, 
would have had adverse impacts to listed species, but were dealt with through informal 
consultation. In these situations, the Federal agency made changes to the project design so 
that adverse impacts to listed species were avoided.”); Houck, supra note 66, at 318 
(“[A]lmost ninety percent of all consultations under the ESA are disposed of informally and 
without fanfare . . . .”). 
74 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-04-93, Endangered Species: More 
Federal Management Attention is Needed to Improve the Consultation Process 7 
(2004) (“[I]n fiscal year 2003, for example, the Services issued only one biological opinion 
that identified proposed activities as potentially jeopardizing threatened and endangered 
species [in the northwest].”); Houck, supra note 66, at 318 (“[O]ver ninety percent of the 
consultations concerning activities sufficiently serious to be conducted formally resulted in 
findings of ‘no jeopardy’ . . . .”). 
75 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A); 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 
76 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536. 
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 The CZMA empowers state, rather than federal, environmental 
agencies.77 It encourages coastal states to develop coastal zone man-
agement plans, primarily through a process called consistency review, 
which allows states with approved plans to force the federal govern-
ment to comply with those plans.78 Since 1990, consistency review has 
applied to all activities, wherever they occur, which affect coastal zone 
resources.79 Offshore lease sales, offshore oil development approvals, 
and even the extension of lease terms in federal waters are therefore 
subject to CZMA review.80 
 Consistency review varies slightly depending upon whether the 
activity is carried out by a federal agency or by a private party with fed-
eral approval.81 Federal activities affecting the coastal zone must be 
consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable 
policies of the state plan.82 The federal action agency must provide the 
state with a consistency determination before beginning the project.83 
If the state objects, the federal action may not proceed unless the fed-
eral agency either responds to the state’s objections, or determines that 
full consistency is precluded by other legal requirements.84 Alterna-
tively, the President can exempt any activity which is “in the paramount 
interest of the United States.”85 
 Applicants for a federal license or permit for activities affecting the 
coastal zone must certify that the proposed activity complies with the 
plan’s enforceable policies.86 If the state disagrees, federal approval 
may not be granted, unless the Secretary of Commerce finds that the 
activity is consistent with the CZMA or “necessary in the interest of na-
tional security.”87 
                                                                                                                      
77 See 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (2006) (“No license or permit shall be granted by the Federal 
agency until the state or its designated agency has concurred with the applicant’s certifica-
tion or until, by the state’s failure to act, the concurrence is conclusively presumed . . . .”). 
78 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1452, 1456. 
79 Id. § 1456(c)(3)(A). 
80 See California v. Norton, 311 F.3d 1162, 1165, 1173 (9th Cir. 2002). 
81 See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c). 
82 Id. § 1456(c). 
83 15 C.F.R. § 930.36(b) (2010). 
84 Id. § 930.43. 
85 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(B). 
86 Id. § 1456(c)(3)(A). 
87 Id. 
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 State consistency objections are rare; “[s]tates have concurred with 
approximately 95 percent” of consistency determinations.88 While rare, 
state vetoes are usually effective.89 State objections have been success-
fully overridden only fourteen times.90 Several of those overrides, how-
ever, came in the context of oil and gas development.91 The oil and gas 
industry has succeeded in half of the cases in which it has appealed 
state vetoes to the Secretary of Commerce.92 
II. Environmental Agency Review of Offshore Oil Development 
 The Gulf experience highlights the difficulties of making outside 
review effective. The environmental review process has been deliber-
ately designed to bring in a series of key outside voices.93 Even if MMS 
was completely captured by the oil industry, those other reviews should 
not have been infected by that relationship. Yet they failed to assure a 
clear-eyed view of the environmental risks of oil development in the 
Gulf. This Part dissects the outside reviews that occurred in the course 
of approval of the Macondo well as a prelude to analyzing the short-
comings of that process. 
A. The Legal Context of Offshore Drilling Approval 
 Offshore oil development is subject to state or federal jurisdiction, 
depending upon its location.94 The states own the submerged lands 
directly adjacent to their coasts.95 The United States owns and controls 
development of the lands further off the coast, to the outer boundary 
                                                                                                                      
88 Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Appeals to the Secretary of Commerce 
Under the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) 1 (2009), available at http://coastal 
management.noaa.gov/consistency/media/appealsdecisionlist011509.pdf. 
89 See id. (noting that there have been fourteen decisions to override state objections, 
and twenty-nine decisions not to override state objections). 
90 Id. 
91 See Carolyn R. Langford et al., The Mouse That Roared: Can Louisiana’s Coastal Zone 
Management Consistency Authority Play a Role in Coastal Restoration and Protection?, 20 Tul. 
Envtl. L.J. 97, 129 (2006). 
92 Id. 
93 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006) (making EISs available to the President, CEQ, 
and the public). 
94 See Rachael E. Salcido, Enduring Optimism: Examining the Rig-to-Reef Bargain, 32 Ecol-
ogy L.Q. 863, 912 (2005). 
95 See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a), 1311 (2006). For most states, including Louisiana, the bound-
ary between state and federal waters lies three geographical miles offshore. See id. § 1301(a). 
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of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone.96 The Macondo well was on 
federal land, fifty miles off the Louisiana coast.97 
 The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) regulates oil and 
natural gas exploration, development, and extraction from federal off-
shore lands.98 Although OCSLA requires environmental safeguards, it 
prioritizes energy development.99 OCSLA establishes a four-stage proc-
ess of planning, leasing, exploration, and development and produc-
tion.100 Government discretion is concentrated in the first two stages.101 
 The first stage is nationwide planning.102 The Secretary of Interior 
prepares and periodically updates an oil and gas leasing plan, indicat-
ing the timing and location of leases that will “best meet national en-
ergy needs.”103 The second stage is leasing.104 The Secretary periodi-
cally offers tracts, typically three square miles, for lease, as proposed in 
the five-year plan.105 
 The exploration stage follows leasing.106 The leaseholder must 
submit an exploration plan for approval before beginning exploration 
activities.107 At this point, government discretion is sharply constrained. 
Interior has only thirty days to review the exploration plan,108 which it 
cannot disapprove unless it finds that the proposed activities would 
probably cause serious harm or damage to life, property, mineral re-
                                                                                                                      
96 Salcido, supra note 94, at 867 n.15. 
97 Neil King, Jr. & Keith Johnson, Obama Decried, Then Used, Some Bush Drilling Policies, 
Wall St. J., July 6, 2010, at A1. 
98 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356 (2006). 
99 See id. § 1332. OCSLA describes the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) as “a vital na-
tional resource reserve . . . which should be made available for expeditious and orderly 
development, subject to environmental safeguards.” Id. § 1332(3). It does, however, call for 
operations on the OCS to “be conducted in a safe manner by well-trained personnel using 
technology, precautions, and techniques sufficient to prevent or minimize the likelihood 
of blowouts, loss of well control, fires, spillages, physical obstruction to other users of the 
waters or subsoil and seabed, or other occurrences which may cause damage to the envi-
ronment or to property, or endanger life or health.” Id. § 1332(6). 
100 Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 337 (1984). 
101 See Robert B. Wiygul, The Structure of Environmental Regulation on the Outer Continental 
Shelf: Sources, Problems, and the Opportunity for Change, 12 J. Energy, Nat. Resources & Envtl. 
L. 75, 171 (1992). 
102 See Sec’y of the Interior, 464 U.S. at 337. 
103 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a). 
104 See Sec’y of the Interior, 464 U.S. at 337. 
105 See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1337, 1344(d)(3)(describing that leases may only be offered in ar-
eas and on terms consistent with the approved leasing program). 
106 See Sec’y of the Interior, 464 U.S. at 337. 
107 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2010). 
108 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1). 
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sources, national security, or the environment.109 If it disapproves an 
exploration plan, Interior may choose to cancel the lease, provided it is 
willing to compensate the lessee.110 
 Lessees also need permits to develop oil or gas once a commer-
cially viable find is made.111 As with exploration plans, Interior has only 
limited ability to disapprove a development and production plan.112 It 
can do so only if: the applicant has not shown that it can comply with 
applicable law; the proposal is not in compliance with the CZMA; the 
proposal would threaten national security or defense; or “because of 
exceptional geological conditions . . . exceptional resource values in 
the marine or coastal environment, or other exceptional circum-
stances,” and proceeding “would probably cause serious harm or dam-
age” to human or aquatic life, property, mineral resources, national 
defense or the environment, and the advantages of disapproval out-
weigh those of development and production.113 
B. Outside Perspectives in the Environmental Review of the Macondo Well 
 Environmental review of offshore oil and gas development is tied to 
the OCSLA stages.114 In the Gulf of Mexico, NEPA review occurs primar-
ily at the planning and leasing stages.115 ESA review also occurs at those 
stages.116 CZMA review occurs later, at the exploration plan stage.117 In 
the course of approving development of the Macondo well, MMS created 
all the required documents.118 In retrospect, it is obvious that MMS’s 
analysis of the environmental risks of deepwater drilling fell badly short 
of the information available at the time,119 as might be expected of a cap-
tured agency.120 More importantly for this Article, MMS also submitted 
its analysis to the required outside agency reviews, but those reviews did 
not correct, or even highlight, the shortcomings of its analysis. 
                                                                                                                      
109 Id. §§ 1334(a)(2)(A)(i), 1340(c). 
110 Id. § 1340(c)(1). 
111 See id. § 1351. 
112 See id. §§ 1340(c), 1351. 
113 Id. § 1351(h)(1); see also 30 C.F.R. § 250.271 (2010). 
114 Alexander, supra note 16, at 3. 
115 See CEQ Report, supra note 16, at 11. 
116 See Letter from Roy E. Crabtree, Reg’l Adm’r, Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., to Joseph 
Christopher, Reg’l Supervisor, Mineral Mgmt. Serv. ( June 29, 2007) (on file with author). 
117 See 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c). 
118 See generally 2007–2012 FEIS, supra note 12. 
119 See id. at IV-1, IV-29. 
120 See id. 
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1. NEPA Review 
 NEPA review can take three forms, depending upon the expected 
level of environmental impact. An EIS must be prepared if the pro-
posed action may significantly affect the quality of the human envi-
ronment.121 An Environmental Assessment (EA) is a less elaborate 
study, prepared with less extensive public and outside agency involve-
ment, used primarily to determine if an EIS is required.122 A categorical 
exclusion is used when the agency has determined in advance that a 
class of actions does not, individually or collectively, have a significant 
environmental impact.123 Agencies invoking categorical exclusions are 
expected to conduct at least a brief review to determine that the exclu-
sion applies.124 
 Each of these forms of review played a role in the lengthy process 
that led to issuance of an exploratory drilling permit for the Macondo 
well.125 Over the course of three years, the NEPA process produced a 
great deal of paper, documented the effects of construction and rou-
tine operations, and confidently but wrongly forecast that the risks of 
environmental damage from a large oil spill were negligible.126 
 MMS routinely prepares an EIS to accompany the five-year offshore 
leasing program.127 In April 2007, the agency released a programmatic 
EIS covering the environmental impacts of the 2007 to 2012 program.128 
In a conspicuous example of “past performance syndrome,” the 2007 to 
2012 EIS estimated the potential magnitude and environmental effects 
of oil spills in the same way the EIS supporting the prior five-year pro-
gram had done. Both EISs relied on historic spill data to estimate the 
likelihood of a “large spill,” meaning one exceeding 1000 barrels.129 
Both based their analysis of environmental effects on mean historical 
spill sizes from a platform (1500 barrels), pipeline (4600 barrels), and 
                                                                                                                      
121 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006). 
122 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2010). 
123 Id. § 1508.4. 
124 See Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Establishing, Apply-
ing, and Revising Categorical Exclusions Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 75 
Fed. Reg. 75,628, 75,629 (Dec. 6, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1500–1508). 
125 See Alexander, supra note 16, at 4, 10, 11. 
126 See generally 2007–2012 FEIS, supra note 12, at IV-1, IV-29. 
127 See generally id.; Minerals Mgmt. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program: 2002–2007, Final Environmental Im-
pact Statement, 4-25 (2002) [hereinafter 2002–2007 FEIS]. 
128 See generally 2007–2012 FEIS, supra note 12. 
129 See 2002–2007 FEIS, supra note 127, at 4-25. 
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tanker (5300 barrels) in the Gulf of Mexico.130 Neither discussed a 
blowout scenario, or questioned whether the historic record was infor-
mative, given the recent trend toward deeper water development.131 
 The earlier EIS did not specifically address the impacts of a deep-
water spill, as opposed to a coastal one, except to opine that a spill oc-
curring in deepwater would not reach the shore.132 The 2007 to 2012 
EIS briefly addressed the expected behavior of a deepwater spill.133 On 
the basis of a single Norwegian experiment at a depth of less than 1000 
meters, it assumed that oil from a deepwater blowout would rise to the 
surface, where “[s]tandard response procedures” could be used.134 Like 
the earlier programmatic EIS, the 2007 to 2012 version assumed that 
any deepwater spill would not reach the coast.135 Indeed, the emphasis 
on deepwater leasing in the 2007 to 2012 program was presented as 
reducing the potential for coastal environmental impacts.136 Overall, 
the tone of both EISs was reassuring. The earlier one repeatedly de-
scribed the impacts of expected spills on a variety of environmental re-
sources as minor to moderate.137 The later one did not use that termi-
nology, but it described impacts on everything from birds to marine 
mammals to fisheries to tourism as localized and temporary.138 
 Neither programmatic EIS included anything like a worst-case 
analysis.139 The law did not require that they do so, at least not explic-
itly. The original CEQ regulations for NEPA implementation, issued in 
1978, had required worst-case analysis when the consequences of a 
                                                                                                                      
130 2007–2012 FEIS, supra note 12, at IV-29; 2002–2007 FEIS, supra note 127, at 4-26. 
131 See generally 2007–2012 FEIS, supra note 12 (mentioning blowouts and their poten-
tial impacts only briefly); 2002–2007 FEIS, supra note 127. 
132 See 2002–2007 FEIS, supra note 127, at 4-46 (“Deepwater spills would either be 
transported away from coastal habitats, or natural weathering processes would prevent 
most of the oil from reaching coastal habitats.”). 
133 See 2007–2012 FEIS, supra note 12, at IV-43. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at IV-57 (“Deepwater spills would either be transported away from coastal habi-
tats or prevented, for the most part, from reaching coastal habitats by natural weathering 
processes.”). 
136 See id. at IV-75 (“Because 75 percent of the development that is expected to occur 
during the 2007–2012 program is assumed to occur far from the coast in deep and ul-
tradeep water, the likelihood of a large spill occurring close enough to the coastline to 
affect turtle nesting beaches is expected to be small.”). That same claim is repeated with 
respect to other coastal resources. See id. 
137 See 2002–2007 FEIS, supra note 127, at 2-2. 
138 See 2007–2012 FEIS, supra note 12, at III-18 to III-68. 
139 See generally 2007–2012 FEIS, supra note 12; 2002–2007 FEIS, supra note 127. 
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proposed federal action were uncertain,140 but that requirement was 
eliminated during the Reagan administration.141 The current regula-
tion requires only that agencies consider the reasonably foreseeable 
impacts of their actions.142 Although it defines “reasonably foreseeable” 
to include catastrophic, low-probability consequences,143 the removal of 
the words “worst case analysis” from the regulation has made it easy for 
agencies to avoid confronting the worst possibilities.144 
 MMS got nowhere near a worst-case analysis.145 It did not even live 
up to a generous interpretation of the current regulation; it considered 
only the consequences of what it thought was the most likely oil spill 
scenario. But no one questioned whether larger spills might be “rea-
sonably foreseeable.”146 EPA reviewed the draft programmatic EIS un-
der its NEPA and Clean Air Act authorities. It identified a handful of 
concerns related to the selection of alternatives, cumulative impacts, 
and the discussion of Clean Water Act permits, but allowed the oil spill 
estimates to pass without comment.147 
 More detailed environmental analysis is tiered to the program-
matic EIS prepared for the five-year program. Another EIS is prepared 
prior to lease sales.148 In the central and western Gulf of Mexico, the 
most active offshore drilling region, MMS prepares a single regional 
EIS for all lease sales proposed by the five-year program.149 For any 
lease sale conducted more than a year after that EIS is issued, MMS also 
                                                                                                                      
140 National Environmental Policy Act—Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, 55,997 (Nov. 
29, 1978). 
141 National Environmental Policy Act—Regulations, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618 (Apr. 25, 
1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (2010)). 
142 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22. 
143 Id. 
144 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 355–56 (1989); 
Houck, supra note 16, at 11,038. 
145 An early critique of NEPA compliance, published in 1977, asserts that EISs issued by 
the Department of Interior were more likely to over- than under-state environmental im-
pacts, “creat[ing] a mood of pessimism about the possible impacts even while ostensibly 
maintaining a neutral tone.” Bardach & Pugliaresi, supra note 37, at 28. While a pessimistic 
mood may have been typical of Interior’s NEPA analyses in that era, it certainly was not 
characteristic of MMS in the years leading up to the Deepwater Horizon blowout. See, e.g., 
2002–2007 FEIS, supra note 127, at iii–v. 
146 See, e.g., id. at 4-202. 
147 Letter from Anne Norton Miller, Dir., Office of Fed. Activities, Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
to James F. Bennett, Branch of Envtl. Assessment, Minerals Mgmt. Serv. (Nov. 22, 2006) 
(on file with author). 
148 Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Dep’t of the Interior, Leasing Oil and Natural Gas Re-
sources: Outer Continental Shelf 20 (2005) [hereinafter MMS, Outer Continental 
Shelf], available at http://www.boemre.gov/ld/PDFs/GreenBook-LeasingDocument.pdf. 
149 Id. at 20. 
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prepares a separate EA to determine if there are additional environ-
mental impacts that were not considered in the regional EIS.150 
 Shortly after completing the 2007 to 2012 programmatic EIS, MMS 
issued a regional EIS for the planned central and western Gulf lease 
sales.151 In October 2007, even though less than a year had passed since 
the programmatic EIS, MMS also issued an EA for Lease Sale 206, 
which included the Macondo prospect.152 That EA found no need for a 
new EIS.153 
 The lease sale environmental analysis added nothing to the pro-
grammatic EIS in terms of the likelihood or consequences of an oil 
spill.154 In fact, in some ways it softened the analysis in the program-
matic document. The lease sale EIS forecast one or two spills over the 
life of the facilities made possible by the group of sales. It predicted 
that those spills would probably come from pipelines; that their most 
likely size was 4600 barrels each; and that any oil spilled in deepwater 
would dissipate before reaching shore.155 MMS acknowledged that “loss 
of well control” was becoming more common and that blowout pre-
venters were known to fail frequently, but still presented the risk of a 
resulting oil spill as minimal.156 EPA reviewed the regional lease sale 
EIS and reported no objections, although it did request more informa-
tion on responses to a spill, “[g]iven the large distances to many new 
OCS operating leases.”157 
                                                                                                                     
 With only that cursory environmental analysis preceding it, Lease 
Sale 206 in the central Gulf of Mexico was offered for bids in March 
2008.158 The sale encompassed a huge geographic area of more than 
 
150 See id. 
151 Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Dep’t of the Interior, Gulf of Mexico OCS Oil and Gas 
Lease Sales: 2007–2012; Western Planning Area Sales 204, 207, 210, 215, and 218; Cen-
tral Planning Area Sales 205, 206, 208, 213, 216, and 222: Final Environmental Impact 
Statement (2007) [hereinafter Lease Sales FEIS], available at http://www.gomr.boemre. 
gov/PDFs/2007/2007-018-Vol1.pdf. 
152 See Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Dep’t of the Interior, MMS 2007-059, Proposed Gulf of 
Mexico OCS Oil and Gas Lease Sale 206, Central Planning Area, Environmental As-
sessment, at ii (2007), available at http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PDFs/2007/2007-059.pdf. 
153 See id. 
154 See id. at 13–63 (analyzing potential impacts). 
155 See Lease Sales FEIS, supra note 151, at 4-228 to -250. 
156 Id. at 4-249 to -250 (noting that of sixty-two instances of loss of well control over ten 
years, only ten resulted in oil loss, the largest being only about 1000 barrels). 
157 Letter from Rhonda M. Smith, Chief, Office of Planning & Coordination, to Chris C. 
Oynes, Reg’l Dir., MMS ( Jan. 9, 2007) (on file with author). 
158 Press Release, MMS, Dep’t of the Interior, MMS Issues Final Notices of Central and 
Eastern Gulf Lease Sales (Feb. 13, 2008), available at http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/ 
whatsnew/newsreal/2008/080213.pdf. 
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5000 three-square-mile blocks.159 It set a revenue record, attracting 
nearly $3.7 billion in high bids.160 Mississippi Canyon Block 252, also 
known as the Macondo prospect, was one of the hot sellers.161 It at-
tracted six different bids.162 BP’s was the highest, at over $34 million.163 
 Once it accepted BP’s bid, the government was committed to al-
lowing exploratory drilling and development unless it could show a 
high likelihood of severe environmental impacts. No more NEPA analy-
sis was undertaken. From 1986 until after the Deepwater Horizon disas-
ter, approvals of exploration or development plans in the central and 
western Gulf of Mexico were covered by a categorical exclusion.164 That 
categorical exclusion was never defended in a public forum.165 On its 
web site, MMS offers a “past performance” justification: “hundreds of 
Environmental Assessments (EAs) were prepared for approval of cer-
tain types of oil and gas exploration and development and production 
plans in the central and western Gulf of Mexico. However, none of 
those EAs identified the need to prepare an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS).”166 
 BP submitted a proposed exploration plan for the Macondo pros-
pect in February 2009.167 It proposed drilling in nearly 5000 feet of wa-
ter, but assured MMS that no new or unusual technologies would be 
                                                                                                                      
159 See id. 
160 Press Release, Office of the Sec’y, Dep’t of the Interior, Oil and Gas Lease Sales in 
Gulf of Mexico Attract $3.7 Billion (Mar. 19, 2008), available at https://www.mms.gov/ 
homepg/whatsnew/newsreal/2008/080319.pdf. 
161 See Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Dep’t of the Interior, Oil and Gas Lease Sale 206: 
Final Bid Recap, Central Gulf of Mexico 42 (2008), available at http://www.gomr. 
boemre.gov/homepg/lsesale/206/206FinalBidRecap.pdf. 
162 See id. 
163 See id. 
164 See Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Dep’t of the Interior, Departmental Manual, at pt. 
516, 15.4(C) (2004) available at http://206.131.241.18/app_DM/act_getfiles.cfm?relnum=3625 
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development/production plan or a Development Operation Coordination Document in 
the central or western Gulf of Mexico”). 
165 Although MMS did invite public comment on its NEPA procedures before finaliz-
ing them, it did not offer any explanation for its categorical exclusions. See National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act; Proposed Implementing Procedures, 50 Fed. Reg. 9132, 9133 (Mar. 
6, 1985). 
166 National Environmental Policy (NEPA)—Categorical Exclusion Reviews, Bureau of Ocean En-
ergy Mgmt., Regulation & Enforcement, http://www.boemre.gov/eppd/compliance/nepa/ 
policy/ce/index.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
167 See generally BP Exploration & Production, Initial Exploration Plan, Missis-
sippi Canyon Block 252 (2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/35728155/29977- 
BP-Initial-Exploration-Plan-Mississippi-Canyon-Block-252-OCS-G-32306. 
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used.168 MMS did not require that the exploration plan evaluate a blow-
out scenario.169 Nonetheless, BP did provide an estimate of the worst-
case scenario, a blowout spewing 162,000 barrels of oil per day.170 The 
company assured MMS that it could handle containment and clean up 
of that worst case, citing its approved oil spill response plan.171 In April 
2009, MMS approved the exploration plan under its Gulf of Mexico 
categorical exclusion, after minimal review,172 as it has done for hun-
dreds of other permits.173 No outside agency reviewed those approvals. 
2. ESA Consultation 
 MMS informally consulted with FWS and NMFS at the planning 
stage on the impacts of the 2007 to 2012 leasing program on threat-
ened and endangered species.174 It took the position that because there 
was not likely to be any adverse effect on listed species, formal consulta-
tion was not required.175 FWS agreed, and therefore conducted no fur-
ther analysis.176 
 Even taking MMS’s rosy oil spill predictions at face value, it is hard 
to see how that conclusion was reached. The 2007 to 2012 program-
matic EIS conceded, for example, that several threatened and endan-
gered coastal bird species could be affected by a nearshore oil spill, and 
that the whooping crane, whose entire population winters on the Texas 
Gulf Coast, could be wiped out by a spill affecting its habitat.177 FWS 
                                                                                                                      
168 See id. at 2-1. 
169 See id.; see also Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Dep’t of the Interior, NTL No. 2008-G04, No-
tice to Lessees and Operators of Federal Oil, Gas, and Sulphur Leases in the Outer 
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171 See id. BP and the other companies drilling in the Gulf routinely issued similar boi-
lerplate assurances. Mike Soraghan, Industry Claims of ‘Proven’ Technology Went Unchallenged 
at MMS, N.Y. Times ( June 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/06/02/02green 
wire-industry-claims-of-proven-technology-went-unch-55514.html?pagewanted=all. 
172 Margaret R. Caldwell et al., Ctr. for Ocean Solutions, The National En-
vironmental Policy Act and a Review of MMS NEPA Documents 6, 8, 12–13 (2010), 
available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/resources. 
173 See id at 6–7; Houck, supra note 16, at 11,036–37. 
174 See Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Interior to Examine Endangered Species Ques-
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appears to have been completely asleep at the switch, perhaps lulled by 
the low probabilities projected for any spill to reach shore. 
 NMFS was a bit more awake. It demanded formal consultation, but 
concluded that the adverse effects on listed species would not reach the 
jeopardy threshold.178 Like FWS, NMFS accepted MMS’s oil spill pro-
jections.179 Assuming, as MMS did, that there would be only three spills 
of roughly 4600 barrels each over the forty-year lifetime of the facilities 
authorized by the program, and that each of these spills would quickly 
disperse and degrade, NMFS determined that the impacts to threat-
ened and endangered species would not violate the ESA.180 
 Like the NEPA analysis, NMFS’s biological opinion did not exam-
ine a worst-case scenario. And like the NEPA analysis, it was ultimately 
far off the mark. Although the full effects are not yet known, they are 
clearly serious. More than four hundred oiled sea turtles have been col-
lected from Gulf waters since the spill.181 Hundreds of endangered sea 
turtle nests were relocated from the northern Gulf Coast to the east 
coast of Florida to protect the hatchlings from swimming into oiled wa-
ters.182 It will be decades before the hatchlings return to nest them-
selves, allowing the success of that effort to be evaluated.183 A satellite 
study has suggested that the spill hit a key spawning ground of the At-
lantic bluefin tuna, which has been declining precipitously in popula-
tion—though it is not yet listed as endangered or threatened.184 Dead 
and dying corals have been found near the blowout site185 and sam-
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(last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
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pling miles away from the wellhead has revealed dead bottom-dwelling 
invertebrates.186 Thousands of birds are known to have been oiled;187 
because detection rates for oiled birds are low, hundreds of thousands 
may have died.188 Similar extrapolations for cetaceans suggest that 
more than 5000 may have been killed.189 The impacts may be continu-
ing; scientists are debating whether an unusual rash of dolphin strand-
ings in the spring of 2011 is connected to the spill.190 
3. CZMA Consistency Determination 
 Although lease sales have been subject to consistency review since 
the 1990 CZMA amendments,191 MMS still prefers to focus state review 
on the exploration and development stages. Both the CZMA and OC-
SLA require consistency review before an exploration or development 
plan is approved.192 Indeed, at those late stages states have greater au-
thority to halt offshore drilling than the federal government; states 
need only find that drilling would be inconsistent with their approved 
coastal plan, while the federal government must find that drilling 
would probably cause severe environmental harm.193 
 States, however, have rarely used this powerful lever.194 In 2006, 
MMS reported that since 1978 it had approved more than 10,000 ex-
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ploration plans and 6000 development and production plans.195 States 
had concurred with nearly all of those approvals.196 There had only 
been eighteen appeals of state consistency objections.197 Seven of those 
objections were overridden by the Secretary of Commerce.198 
 Very occasionally, states have objected at other OCSLA stages.199 
Between 1990, when the CZMA was expanded to cover activities indi-
rectly affecting the states’ coastal zones, and 2006, there was only one 
state objection to a lease sale.200 States have objected six times since 
1990 to five-year plans.201 One objection was withdrawn, two were over-
ridden, and three were allowed to stand.202 Although states have rarely 
used the CZMA to halt offshore drilling, they have been able to negoti-
ate conditions and information provisions. For example, exploration 
and development plans potentially affecting Florida must include blow-
out scenarios, while those expected to affect only Louisiana need not do 
.20
ately withdrew the 1991 
demand that MMS and BP provide more information, at the explora-
                                                                                                                     
so 3 
 Louisiana has been especially reluctant to use its CZMA authority 
against oil and gas operations. It has objected only twice, once in 
1991,204 and again in 2006.205 In both cases, MMS refused to back 
down, and Louisiana filed suit. Louisiana ultim
suit, and settled the 2006 suit on favorable terms.206 
 Despite those brief showings of backbone, by the time the Ma-
condo well was approved Louisiana had returned to passivity. It appears 
that MMS submitted a consistency determination to Louisiana for its 
five-year plan and another for Lease Sale 206.207 The state did not ob-
ject to either.208 Louisiana had another opportunity to object, or to 
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207 See Sam Kalen, The BP Macondo Well Exploration Plan: Whither the Coastal Zone Man-
agement Act?, 40 Envtl. L. Rep. 11,079, 11,082–83 (2010). 
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tion plan stage, but again it did not.209 As a result, the CZMA process 
did not act as a check on either MMS’s environmental analysis or its 
frantic push to facilitate offshore drilling. 
                                                                                                                     
III. Filling in the Missing Ingredients 
 Claims about the likelihood and consequences of a drilling-
associated oil spill made by BP and endorsed by MMS throughout the 
course of multiple rounds of environmental review turned out to be 
disastrously wrong. Not only were they wrong in hindsight, there was 
plenty of contemporary evidence that deepwater drilling presented far 
greater environmental hazards than MMS acknowledged.210 
 MMS itself had produced some of that evidence. Eight years before 
Lease Sale 206, MMS issued an EA for deepwater drilling operations 
(“Deepwater EA”) which contradicted key assumptions of the subse-
quent studies.211 The Deepwater EA concluded that: “[d]eepwater op-
erations have the potential to result in oil spills on the OCS that are 
greatly larger than those previously analyzed;”212 that the behavior of 
underwater oil plumes could not be confidently predicted;213 that blow-
outs, although rare, were far from unknown over the previous twenty-
five years and would be more difficult to control in deepwater;214 and 
that technology was changing rapidly enough that reassessment would 
be needed periodically.215 
 Yet neither MMS nor any of the environmental agencies invited or 
required to review the environmental documentation preceding ap-
proval of the Macondo well suggested that a catastrophic oil spill might 
occur, or that one would be difficult to contain or clean up. Not only 
did MMS fail at its regulatory task, the environmental agencies failed at 
their oversight task. 
 MMS was thoroughly captured by the industry it was supposed to 
regulate, and it fell into an analytic routine where it simply repeated 
one set of analyses over and over again without critical examination, 
assuming that because there had not been a major disaster in the re-
 
209 See id. at 11,083. 
210 See, e.g., Houck, supra note 16, at 11,033–35. 
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cent past there was no threat of one in the future.216 Those tendencies 
are endemic to many regulatory agencies and difficult to correct inter-
nally. Oversight by agencies with an environmental mission was sup-
posed to counteract them, but also failed disastrously. 
 Part of the ineffective oversight story, no doubt, is that many of the 
key events happened during the Bush administration, when the leader-
ship of the wildlife agencies was not committed to environmental pro-
tection.217 But oversight mechanisms should be robust in the face of 
changes in administrations, at least to the extent of making environ-
mental trade-offs visible to the political process. The Deepwater Hori-
zon experience highlights some systematic shortcomings and suggests 
reforms that could improve the oversight process in any administration. 
A. The Elements of Effective Review 
 Two things are needed to make outside review effective. First, the 
attention of the reviewer needs to be captured and focused on the sali-
ent issues. Agencies are chronically short of resources and face many 
demands on their time.218 Unless they understand the importance of 
their task in the specific context, they may treat the review as a matter of 
routine. Furthermore, reviewers should not face unnecessary barriers to 
identifying the most important or questionable elements of the analysis. 
Second, for activities that pose an uncertain or low-probability risk of 
dire environmental harm, reviewers need access to the expertise re-
quired to review the risk as well as the potential environmental impacts. 
 Getting the oversight agencies’ committed attention is the key to 
improving the oversight process. Federal agencies produce roughly 250 
to 300 draft EISs each year, and close to an equal number of final 
EISs.219 There are many more EAs220 and untold numbers of categori-
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cal exclusions.221 All told, there is plenty to keep the relatively small 
proportion of EPA staff dedicated to NEPA reviews busy. Similarly, the 
FWS faces some 35,000 requests for consultation each year, also cover-
ing a wide range of projects.222 Although most are dealt with infor-
mally,223 the resource demands are still substantial. 
                                                                                                                     
 The need for something to grab the reviewing agencies’ attention is 
heightened if effective review requires the agency to go beyond its core 
expertise, as it typically does where a risk assessment is needed. Evaluat-
ing the probability and magnitude of a blowout is a very different task 
than evaluating the harm that released oil will cause. The former re-
quires the skills of an engineer rather than a biologist. In addition, good 
risk evaluation requires an understanding of where oil will go and how it 
will degrade in the marine environment—well outside the expertise of 
species experts. The further afield the necessary analysis drifts from the 
reviewing agency’s core expertise, the more important it will be to per-
suade the agency that it merits an extraordinary effort. 
 The attention of reviewing agencies needs to be directed both 
generally at the documents that could most benefit from oversight, and 
specifically on the key portions of those documents. An early criticism 
of NEPA environmental analyses remains accurate: they are “very bulky 
documents”224 that tend to spend many pages on matters of limited 
relevance to the decision, are often organized in ways that are difficult 
to follow,225 and do not highlight the most important issues.226 CEQ 
could help on this score by updating its guidelines for implementing 
NEPA. Those guidelines require that NEPA documents “be written in 
plain language . . . so that decisionmakers and the public can readily 
understand them.”227 Anyone who has plowed through an EIS knows 
that regulation has not produced documents which are either readable 
or understandable. With the benefit of more than forty years of NEPA 
experience, CEQ should try to develop broader guidance for organiza-
tion and presentation of NEPA analyses to highlight the issues of great-
est controversy or importance to the decision. EPA could also use its 
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mandated review of all federal EISs228 to highlight and request im-
provement of unnecessarily turgid or confusing documents. 
 Reviewing agencies also need access to appropriate expertise, 
which may go well beyond their core competence. They might get that 
expanded expertise by providing current employees with additional 
training, hiring new employees with the needed skills, or contracting 
with expert consultants. In some cases that additional expertise may 
only be needed for a short term, to prepare a primer or guidance 
document that can be used by non-expert reviewers.229 The reviewing 
agency must have experts responsive to its environmental mission in 
order to perform its oversight function effectively. But it also must have 
experts capable of understanding the engineering challenges of deep-
water oil production, the technologies currently in use and on the ho-
rizon, and the options for responding to a blowout. Perhaps that exper-
tise already exists in the federal government—the United States 
Geological Survey has considerable experience with oil production.230 
Perhaps it exists in academia or in the National Academies—following 
the Deepwater Horizon disaster, Interior sought review of the blowout 
by the National Academy of Engineering.231 However it is done, 
though, invoking that additional expertise will impose resource costs, 
which must come either from other agency programs or from added 
appropriations. That is why it is critical to persuade reviewing agencies 
of the importance of their task. 
B. Getting the Attention of Oversight Agencies with Worst-Case Analysis 
 An effective oversight procedure must provide clear signals to re-
viewing agencies of when they should be willing to invest unusual levels 
of resources. Clear and explicit worst-case analysis, as CEQ once re-
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quired under NEPA, can provide that signal. Worst-case analysis need 
not be required for every project; it is important only when there is an 
uncertain or low probability risk of a disastrous event, like an oil well 
blowout or a successful terrorist attack on a nuclear installation.232 
Worst-case analysis is especially important where an agency individually 
approves large numbers of projects, each of which has a low probability 
of causing large harm, as MMS does in the Gulf of Mexico. Multiplied 
by hundreds or thousands of deepwater operations, even a very low in-
dividual probability of catastrophe becomes significant. 
 By highlighting the importance of technological, engineering, or 
other assumptions, a worst-case analysis can help reviewing agencies 
identify the additional expertise they need to effectively fulfill their 
roles. If they fully understood how crucial MMS’s assumptions about 
the low probability and limited extent of oil spills were to the environ-
mental analysis, EPA and the wildlife agencies might have been more 
highly motivated to push on the justification for those assumptions. 
They might have assigned staff to track MMS’s environmental analyses, 
including the Deepwater EA which seemed to disappear into thin air 
once it had been completed. They might have contracted with the Na-
tional Academy of Engineering, with the United States Geological Sur-
vey, or with other outside experts to advise them or to peer review 
MMS’s assumptions. And they could have made a better case to budget 
and political authorities for devoting those resources to those purposes. 
 That raises another issue—the mindset of reviewing agencies must 
be broadened, both from within and from without. Environmental 
agencies have to internalize the idea that their job requires them to 
understand key industries as well as the environment. Ideally, they 
should be encouraged by the administration at the highest level, and by 
the relevant congressional oversight committees, to see that form of 
review as an essential aspect of their mission. Again, having a serious, 
robust worst-case analysis could help both internal and external audi-
ences make that connection. 
 A serious, robust worst-case analysis might also help reluctant states 
see the importance of their own oversight role and commit the re-
sources necessary to fulfill that role. The CZMA has been a tool of 
widely varying utility, in large part because different states have dis-
played very different willingness and ability to use it. California and 
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Florida, two states highly conscious of the contribution of their coastal 
environment to their economies, have wielded the CZMA effectively 
against offshore drilling and other threats.233 Louisiana has not.234 In 
part, that is simply a reflection of the states’ different economic goals, 
or perhaps of the different economic and political power of the poten-
tial victims of offshore accidents. But it may also be a reflection of the 
unwillingness of Louisiana to confront the tension between its com-
mitment to the oil and gas industry, its established commercial fishing 
industry, and its increasing emphasis on tourism. A robust worst-case 
analysis might have brought home the potential costs, economic and 
social, of a catastrophe before one happened, helping the state more 
realistically evaluate the trade-offs it was unknowingly making.235 
 Furthermore, an accurate worst-case analysis would allow other 
states a say in the trade-offs which affect them, and would facilitate a 
clearer view of the extent to which nationally important resources were 
at stake. Although the bulk of the coastal impacts from the Deepwater 
Horizon blowout have been felt in Louisiana, oil found its way to 
beaches in Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi;236 fishing closures and 
tourism scares affected the regional economy;237 and the spill’s continu-
ing effects threaten bird and fish species that are national assets.238 Yet 
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MMS has been all too willing in the past to follow the gung-ho, “drill, 
baby, drill” attitude of pro-drilling states like Louisiana.239 That defer-
ence to local preferences can seem justified if Louisiana bears the brunt 
of both the economic costs of restricting drilling and the environmental 
costs of any disaster. To the extent that worst-case analysis shows that a 
significant portion of the environmental costs may be externalized, it 
would encourage wider engagement in the ultimate decision. 
 A worst-case analysis sufficient to serve this purpose need not be 
difficult either for the action agency to produce or for a reviewing 
agency to evaluate. For the Macondo well, for example, a worst-case 
analysis would have considered the highest expected pressure in the 
well, the size of the reservoir, the worst time of year for a blowout, and 
where the oil might go if it did not quickly degrade and hit unfavorable 
wind or current conditions. The attention-grabbing headline of a worst-
case analysis will motivate reviewing agencies—and the interested pub-
lic—to question whether the action agency has gotten the nuances 
right. 
 One might legitimately question what difference more skeptical 
oversight and a credible worst-case analysis would make to the ultimate 
decisions. The short answer is that it would force decision makers to ac-
tually confront the potential trade-offs. Additionally, federal or state 
regulators could have demanded more credible assurances in advance 
that BP knew how to kill a wild deepwater well, required that a relief well 
be drilled in parallel with the exploratory well, researched the effective-
ness and impacts of dispersants applied in deep water, or checked to see 
if promised response capabilities actually existed. 
C. Getting from Here to There 
 Perhaps the most attractive feature of this analysis is that it suggests 
a fix which does not need congressional action or even regulatory 
change. CEQ can explicitly amend its regulations to reinstate the worst-
case analysis requirement. But regulatory correction, while desirable, is 
not necessary. CEQ never firmly renounced worst-case analysis, it sim-
ply dropped the explicit reference to it.240 The current regulation con-
tinues to require that NEPA documentation analyze even low probabil-
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ity catastrophic results, provided they lie within the rule of reason.241 In 
an August report on the Deepwater Horizon NEPA failures, CEQ sug-
gested—although its phrasing could have been more explicit—that 
blowout analysis must be included in future NEPA documentation for 
offshore drilling approvals.242 EPA, in its NEPA oversight role, should 
make sure that BOEMRE follows that recommendation,243 that its 
analysis is a worst-case one rather than a simple reassurance that blow-
outs are not usually disastrous,244 and that other agencies whose actions 
raise risks of catastrophe also include credible worst-case analyses. 
 The wildlife agencies should follow CEQ’s lead. They also need 
not amend their regulations, although the better practice would be to 
do so.245 They should require that action agencies seeking either for-
mal consultation or concurrence with a no adverse effects determina-
tion include a worst-case analysis for any low-probability but high-
impact effects. 
                                                                                                                     
 Where environmental risks result from technological advances, as 
in the case of offshore oil development, it would also be desirable to 
have periodic outside review of technological change—such as increas-
ing capability to exploit deepwater petroleum reserves—and the extent 
to which it increases existing environmental risks or adds new ones. 
Worst-case analysis can highlight contexts in which such review would 
be helpful. Congress should impose periodic review requirements, but 
the administration need not wait for legislative action. Worst-case analy-
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Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) did pre-
pare a “Catastrophic Spill Event Analysis,” based on a Deepwater Horizon-sized blowout. 
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Lease Sale 218, Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, at App. B 
(2011). That analysis provides a much more detailed picture of the potential for serious long-
term environmental damage from a blowout than the agency’s pre-Deepwater Horizon NEPA 
documents. See id. Unfortunately it is buried in an appendix while the text of the draft EIS 
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245 Eighteen months ago, the Obama administration issued notice that it was consider-
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declaration. See Interagency Cooperation Under the Endangered Species Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 
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sis should help increase the leverage of environmental agencies within 
the administration and even within cabinet departments. The Secretary 
of the Interior, alerted by FWS and other environmental bureaus, could 
seek the advice of the National Academy of Engineering or other out-
side experts as part of the periodic OCSLA planning process. If the 
Department of the Interior declines to institute a commitment to such 
review on its own, the President could mandate it through executive 
order, or could make it part of his recently launched marine spatial 
planning initiative.246 
Conclusion 
 MMS was a rogue agency. Forty years of experience suggests, how-
ever, that it was not alone in its cavalier treatment of environmental re-
view requirements.247 The availability of citizen suits helps, but lack of 
resources and expertise make the public an imperfect watchdog. Envi-
ronmental agencies can play that role most effectively. But the Deepwa-
ter Horizon saga exposes some serious flaws in outside agency oversight. 
 A robust worst-case analysis requirement for risky activities, which 
could be imposed by administrative fiat or even interpretation, would go 
a long way toward improving environmental agency oversight. Strength-
ening and actually trying to enforce mandates for readability, and re-
quiring that environmental analyses focus on issues of importance to the 
decision would also help. In the long term, of course, it would be better 
for Congress to impose clearer and stronger environmental protection 
obligations in development statutes like OCSLA.248 Requiring that the 
Department of the Interior not only solicit the comments of environ-
mental agencies on its five-year plans for offshore development, but also 
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respond to any objections in writing would greatly improve environ-
mental oversight. 
 Of course, the real challenge is to foresee the next problem. No 
doubt at least in the immediate future both industry and regulators will 
be well attuned to the kind of failure that occurred on the Deepwater 
Horizon. Whether they will better anticipate and plan for the next un-
expected low-probability environmental disaster is another question. 
With strong external review as a starting point, the answer is more likely 
to be yes. 
